

ACTION

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

March 1, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: WINSTON LORD
SUBJECT: Informing the Cambodians about Your
Peking Conversation

At Tab B is an incoming cable from Swank telling us that the Cambodians are very anxious to get a read-out of your talks in Peking.

At Tab M is a draft response which is an attempt to give them some feeling of being debriefed without getting into dangerous territory. I have tried to suggest that both we and the Chinese would favor direct negotiations among the parties. On the other hand, I have tried to keep this relatively anodyne, given the Cambodians' reputation for leaking.

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RECOMMENDATION

That, after scrutinizing Tab A, you approve it for transmittal to Swank.

✓
_____ APPROVE _____ OTHER

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NSS, State Dept. reviews completed

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TO: AMBASSADOR SWANK - Phnom Penh

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

REF: Phnom Penh 1820

1. This is in response to reftel covering Cambodians' inquiries on my talks in Peking, to supplement Sullivan's briefings on the Hanoi leg. You can tell the Cambodians the following on a close hold basis, with the clear understanding that this information is for the leadership only.

2. In Peking, as well as in Hanoi, I emphasized the following themes:

-- With settlements in Vietnam and Laos, there must now be peace brought to Cambodia. We have always taken the position that the conflict must stop in all of Indochina if there is to be a stable peace in any part of it.

-- In any event there should be a prompt withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, as well as Laos, as stipulated in Article 20(b) of the Vietnam Agreement. This obligation is not tied to a final settlement in Cambodia or any other condition.

-- The Lon Nol government, as announced ahead of time, showed military restraint in an effort to halt hostilities. The communists have

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nevertheless continued their operations.

-- It is important to get direct negotiations going among the Cambodian parties. I said I believed that if there were a ceasefire ~~that~~ withdrawal of foreign forces, the Lon Nol government would talk seriously to the other Cambodian parties in an effort to find a solution.

3. In response, the Chinese took the position that Cambodian affairs should be settled by the Cambodians themselves and the PRC should not intervene. They maintained their support for Sihanouk and suggested I speak to him, which of course I rejected. They did agree that a settlement would be easier if the conflict were purely a civil war. They were receptive to the concept of a central, independent Cambodia but did not want to be drawn into specifics.

4. In short, my visit gave us the opportunity to present our strong views on Cambodia. The Chinese, in turn, continued to back Sihanouk but gave the impression that they would not object to direct negotiations among the Cambodians and a sharing of power.

5. We will, of course, keep the Cambodian government informed of any significant developments with respect to Hanoi or Peking. In turn, we hope they will keep us posted on their own diplomatic intentions and activities.

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